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The Role of Competition and Patient Travel in Hospital Profits: Why Health Insurers 
Should Subsidize Patient Travel 
Abstract 
 This paper explores the effects of patient travel distance on hospital profit margins, with 
consideration to the effects of travel subsidies on hospital pricing. We develop a model in which 
hospital agglomeration leads to a negative relationship between profit margins and patient travel 
distance, challenging the standard IO theory that profit margins are higher for firms with greater 
distances of customer travel. Using data on patient visits and hospital finances from the 
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), we test our theory 
and confirm that a hospital tends to have less pricing power if it draws patients from beyond its 
local cluster. We then consider how our results might justify the subsidizing of patient travel by 
insurers and government payers. Lastly, we present an argument for why the ubiquitous 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market concentration can be robust to owner and system-level 
hospital cooperation.  
I. Introduction  
 During the last thirty years, health insurers have clearly demonstrated that influencing 
patient choice can be a profitable business model. While virtually non-existent in the late 1970s, 
the Managed Care Organization (MCO) is now the dominant form of employer-provided health 
insurance, with a 72 percent market share in 2012 (Kongstvedt, 2012: 10). The MCOs achieve 
cost savings by directing their large pools of patients toward lower-priced ‗in-network‘ hospitals, 
encouraging providers to compete for membership in the network.  By fostering this competition, 
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the MCOs have effectively reduced hospital prices and operating costs (Dranove 1993; Bamezai 
et al. 1999). 
 Despite the success of the MCO model on a large scale, its performance in local markets 
depends on hospital concentration. When a hospital has few local substitutes, an MCO may be 
forced to send its patients there, regardless of price, and gains little leverage from network 
contracting. Thus, with MCOs as the dominant means of private medical payership, it is little 
surprise that hospital prices are closely linked with measures of market concentration. In general, 
when a market has a large number of hospitals, the MCOs are more successful and medical 
prices are lower (Zwanziger et al. 1994; Bamezai et al. 1999).  
 While the existing research has noted that MCOs are more effective in less concentrated 
markets, it offers little prescription for how an insurer might encourage hospitals in a given 
market to be more competitive. That is the main focus of this paper. We consider how an insurer 
might use its information on patient origins to encourage hospital competition by subsidizing 
patient travel costs. To develop a theory of how patient travel affects hospital profits, we use the 
‗circular city‘ framework of Salop (1979). We first assume that travel costs take a simple linear 
form, but later in section II.A we relax this assumption and show the construction of a profitable 
subsidy for a general class of travel cost functions. The key intuition for the subsidy is that, by 
modifying patient travel costs, an insurer can induce a prisoner‘s dilemma in hospital pricing. 
When this occurs, each hospital will want to reduce its price, given the prices of its neighbors, 
yet if we assume no cooperation, every hospital lowers its price and is less profitable in the end. 
This result suggests that MCOs could use their influence over patient choice to encourage 
hospital price competition in ways other than selective contracting.  
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While the model we develop may have implications for other industries, it is especially 
applicable to the market for healthcare, in which payers tend to be very organized. The modern 
health insurer is effectively a collective bargainer on the behalf of its patients, and—as 
demonstrated by the success of MCOs—enjoys substantial market power compared to buyers in 
other industries. The state and federal government payers, moreover, have even greater market 
influence, and could benefit from the strategies described herein if their objectives include lower 
hospital prices.  
During our discussion of travel cost subsidies, we also consider the spatial distribution of 
hospitals, with a particular focus on hospital clustering. When hospitals benefit from 
agglomeration economies, they may choose to co-locate in a compact area, and this clustering 
reduces the initial cost of the subsidy and has implications for its effectiveness. As we show in 
section II.A, clustering can also lead to a negative relationship between patient travel distance 
and hospital profit margins. This result offers a caveat to the common story in industrial 
economics that firms with greater customer travel distance have higher profits.  
Finally, a secondary goal of this paper is to examine the predominant measure of market 
concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), to test whether it is robust to owner-level 
interactions. Whether as a response to MCOs, or due to new economies of scale, the U.S. 
hospital industry has seen a surge of mergers and system expansions in the last two decades.
1
 
According to the American Hospital Association, the number of community hospitals decreased 
from 5,384 to 4,985 between 1990 and 2010, and the number belonging to systems increased 
from 2,524 to 2,941 in the last decade. To calculate HHI, one must decide whether to use firm- 
                                                             
1 A hospital merger occurs when two hospitals come under the same ownership, operating under a common license 
and keeping shared financial records. A health system, on the other hand, is a collection of hospitals with the same 
owner but separate facilities, licenses, and financial statements (Dranove 2003: 984). 
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or owner-level market shares, and with the recent consolidation, it might seem this choice has 
substantial implications. However, we argue theoretically and empirically that in practical 
applications, the owner- and hospital-level HHI give similar results in regression models, with 
the former having a slightly greater effect on hospital pricing. 
 In section II we discuss the theory of how patient travel affects hospital profits, show the 
construction of a profitable patient travel subsidy, and examine the effect of hospital 
consolidation on HHI. Section III covers our data sources, construction of key variables, and the 
specification of our regression model. The empirical results appear in Section IV, and section V 
concludes. 
II.     Theory 
A.     Patient Travel and Hospital Profits 
The existing theoretical literature has much to say about the effects of customer travel on 
the profits of firms. An early and influential analysis was Hotelling‘s ‗linear city‘ model, in 
which customers are evenly distributed along a line segment, and two firms compete by choosing 
a location and price (Hotelling 1929). The moral of the linear city is very believable—namely, 
that firms prefer to have distance between them (D‘Aspremont et al. 1979) because it functions 
as a means of product differentiation. 
The linear city can be adapted to hold  firms if we transform it into a circular city 




The takeaway from the circular city is similar to that of the linear model. If firms are 
allowed to choose their locations, and if transportation costs have a quadratic form, the firms will 
place themselves to achieve maximum separation (Economides 1984). The intuition for this 
result is that when a firm is close to a group of customers, it can earn a profit by charging for the 
convenience. 
However, if we adjust the model once more, placing the firms in clusters as shown in 
Figure 4, we get a different result. As described by D‘Aspremont et al., the nearness of firms 
creates discontinuities in their profit functions, and this can lead to surprising results about the 
pricing strategies and existence of Nash-Cournot equilibria. In the rest of this section we 
formalize these results in the context of hospital markets, and show how insurers and 




To start, we assume that hospitals are placed exogenously in clusters. In reality, however, 
hospitals may choose to forms clusters due to agglomeration economies: firms prefer to co-locate 
in areas with a large pooling of skilled labor, concentration of specialized suppliers, and greater 
interaction and knowledge spillover between workforces. When a hospital is located near a large 
amount of healthcare activity, these agglomeration economies provide significant cost-savings, 
particularly in the provision of inpatient services (Cohen & Paul 2008; Bates & Santerre 2005). 
Later in this section we consider how accounting for endogenous clustering might affect our 
results, but our initial analysis assumes exogenous placement. Throughout our work in this 
section we consider a cluster as a group of three hospitals, which is suitable because our model 
of space is effectively one-dimensional. 
With an arrangement like in Figure 4, a hospital inside a cluster has a strong incentive to 
reduce its price below its neighbors‘ prices, especially when the distance between clusters is 
large. Intuitively, a larger distance between clusters means that an interior hospital would gain 
more patient volume by capturing its neighbors‘ market shares. In the following analysis, we 
show how this threat of price reductions places an upper bound on the equilibrium prices, which 
leads to an unusual negative relationship between patient travel and hospital profits.   
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So suppose we have  hospitals in a circular city, and each hospital  faces constant 
marginal costs  for a patient visit. Patients in the city are evenly distributed, with 
density one, along the edge of the circle, remain on the circle while traveling, and always buy a 
hospital visit (i.e. no patient is priced out of the market). They face a linear cost of travel  for 
a trip of distance : 
 We consider what happens when the hospitals reside in clusters of three, as shown in 
Figure 4.  The distance between two adjacent hospitals in a cluster is assumed to be uniform and 
denoted by , while the distance between clusters is . In general terms, if we hold  constant 
while increasing , we observe a greater degree of clustering in the placement of hospitals (see 
Figure 5 for a concrete picture of this). We want our model to explain how this increase in 
clustering would affect the pricing strategies of hospitals. For the reasons discussed above, we 
hypothesize that the interior hospitals will have a greater incentive to capture the market share 
between clusters, and will be more aggressive in their price competition. To explain this behavior 
theoretically we need to examine how patients choose a hospital and the implications for hospital 
pricing. 
For any patient in the city, the total cost of visiting a hospital  is the cost of travelling to 
that hospital plus the price  of its services. In Figure 5, we project the circular city onto a 
number line and show the total cost curves for five hospitals—three in a cluster and two adjacent 
to the cluster—as functions of patient location. Each hospital charges the same price to its 
patients, but patients observe different travel costs based on their locations. For example, if a 
patient is located at a distance  from hospital , the total cost curve for  would have the 
  (2.1)  
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value  at his location, which is the amount that he would pay in total to travel to  and 
purchase a medical visit. 
Figure 5: A Cluster in the City 
 
Each patient chooses the hospital that has the lowest cost curve at his location. As the 
patients are distributed with density one, the total patient volume for hospital  is the length of 
horizontal space over which  has the lowest cost curve. The hospitals compete for patient 
volume by adjusting their prices and shifting their cost curves up or down. To maximize profit, 
each hospital must weigh the benefits of raising its price against the cost of serving a smaller 
number of patients. Using the Nash-Cournot criterion, the system will be in equilibrium when 
every hospital has chosen a price which maximizes its profits, while taking as given the prices of 
its competitors.  
 To analyze the prices at a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, we first suppose that each hospital 
begins with a price  if it resides on the outer edge of a cluster, and 
 if it resides inside a cluster. By expressing the prices in this way, we can show 
that every hospital has a gross profit margin greater than the travel cost  simply by showing 
that  is positive. This will have implications for the existence of a profitable patient travel 
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subsidy, as we explain below. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that hospitals like  
and , which are on the edge of a cluster, should have the same price  at equilibrium, because 
they have the same products and face symmetric positioning with respect to competitors. By the 
same reasoning, hospitals like , which are located within clusters, should have the same price 
 at equilibrium. The approach of assuming symmetry in pricing is a common step in the 
literature (Tirole 1988: 283).  
 The profit function of an exterior hospital—take, for example, —is the product of its 
gross profit margin  and total patient volume. To find ‘s patient volume we compute the 
length of the interval over which it has the lowest total cost function. Between hospitals  and 
 the intersection of cost curves happens where a patient is indifferent between the two 
hospitals, i.e. at a distance  where . After substituting for  and  
this condition reduces to the following: 
or, 
 Likewise, between  and  the intersection of cost curves happens at a distance  
from , where 
or, 
  (2.2)  
 
 (2.3)  
  (2.4)  
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 So the total patient volume for the exterior hospital  is  
which makes the profit  of  equal to , or 
 By the same process, an interior hospital will have a gross profit margin of , 
patient volume of  , and profit  as expressed in Eq. 2.8. Note that, as one might 
expect, when adjacent hospitals have the same price (i.e. ), they split the market between 
them into equal parts. 




 (2.5)  
 
 (2.6)  
 
 (2.7)  
 
 (2.8)  
 
 (2.9)  
 
 (2.10)  
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 However, the unique values  and   that satisfy these conditions do not 
necessarily yield the final equilibrium prices. This is because the profit functions of the hospitals 
are not everywhere differentiable (as in d‘Aspremont et al. 1979). Whenever  is positive, 
hospital  can potentially earn a profit by dropping its price to , thereby capturing the 
entire patient volume of  and  as shown in Figure 6. The profit function of  is generally 
discontinuous when the cost curves intersect exactly at the exterior hospitals, because  can see 
a large jump in its profit by dropping its price marginally and taking the entire market of its 
cluster. By comparing the profits of  before and after the price drop, we can derive a 
‗clustering constraint‘—i.e., a sufficient condition for when  and  do not yield the 
equilibrium prices. 
Figure 6: Hospital  Reduces Its Price 
 
 Before  drops its price to , it has profit  as expressed in Eq. 2.7. After the 
price decrease, it will have profit : 
  (2.11)  
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 To calculate this new profit, we find the interior hospital‘s new patient volume and 
multiply it by the new profit margin of . The new patient volume is clearly  because 
 captures the entirety of its cluster ( ) while also getting half of the market on either side of 
the cluster ( ). We can also compute patient volume more formally as we do in Eq. 2.2, and the 
result is the same.  
  The interior hospital will drop its price, attempting to capture the entire market of its 
cluster, if and only if : 
or, 
By substituting  for  and  for  in Eq. 2.13, we can show that, when the prices 
satisfy the traditional first-order conditions (Eq. 2.9 and 2.10), any interior hospital will try to 
capture its local market if the distances  and  are such that 
 Intuitively, if the clusters are compact enough, the interior hospitals are more aggressive 
in their price competition, since they have more to gain by capturing the markets outside of their 
clusters. When Eq. 2.14 is satisfied, then the Nash prices  and 
 are not the equilibrium prices. Note that the constraint in 2.14 is actually quite loose—
it is satisfied, for instance, if , i.e. when the hospitals are evenly distributed. In other 
 
 (2.12)  
 
 (2.13)  
 
 (2.14)  
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words, even when clustering is low in intensity, the threat of price reductions by interior 
hospitals begins to affect the steady state. Our expectation is that, when the degree of clustering 
increases, this effect will become more substantial. 
 Of course, this raises the question: what are the equilibrium prices when the hospitals are 
clustered? It turns out that when Eq. 2.14 holds, the prices of the interior and the exterior 
hospitals must be lower than the Nash equilibrium prices satisfying Eq. 2.9 and 2.10. To show 
this, we start by making several observations about the profit maximizing prices for each 
hospital. Importantly, we do not assume that there is one unique equilibrium, but rather we 
derive conditions that apply to all possible equilibria. This approach is helpful because there 
happen to be several steady states, and our conclusions apply to all of them.  
 First, the minimum value for both   and  is – , since any smaller value would 
have the hospitals pricing below marginal cost. However, any set of prices where  and 
 cannot yield the equilibrium, because if  and  are negative we have , which 
would make every exterior hospital increase its price. Second, we can tell from the first order 
conditions in Eq. 2.9 and 2.10 that the equilibrium prices must be such that  and , 
for if   and , then , and if  and , then , so any hospital 
that has a negative  would earn a profit by charging a higher price. 
 Finally, the presence of clustering effectively places a ceiling over  and , which binds 
if the above inequality is satisfied. When the system is in equilibrium, every hospital has chosen 
a price that maximizes its profit given the prices of its competitors. Hence, at any equilibrium we 
have  and , because if either derivative were negative, the exterior or interior 
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hospitals, respectively, would earn a profit by charging lower prices. These inequalities can hold 
in a non-strict form (i.e. ) if and only if the clustering ceiling prevents the hospitals from 
increasing . 
 In short, there are three possibilities for system equilibria when the clustering inequality 
is true. Either the ceiling binds for  alone (  and ), for  alone (  and 
), or for both together (  and ). Notably, whenever one profit derivative is 
strictly positive ( ), it is not a traditional Nash equilibrium. But it is still a stable outcome, 
because hospital  finds it profitable to keep raising its price until it hits the ceiling, but 
recognizes that a higher price would lead to zero profits. In fact, it is possible for a given system 
to have up to three such equilibria, with the final outcome depending on ,  and the 
beginning values of  and . However, this potential for multiple equilibria does not prevent us 
from drawing specific conclusions about the relationship between patient travel distance and 
hospital profits. In particular, we can derive upper bounds for the values of  and , and use 
these to show that a negative relationship exists between  and hospital prices. To start, recall 
from Eq. 2.13 that, for a given  and , the interior hospitals will drop their prices to  
and capture their neighbor‘s market shares if and only if  
 
 (2.15)  
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 If this occurs, the exterior hospitals have zero output and profit. Since the exterior 
hospitals would never be satisfied with such an outcome, any equilibrium must be characterized 
by 
 But we know from the discussion above that  at any equilibrium, so  
and we have 
 
And we also know that  at equilibrium, so . Hence, 
 Notice that these upper bounds for  and  in Eq. 2.17 and 2.18 are actually quite small 
in dollar terms. In our data from the OSHPD, the average distance between a hospital and its 
closest neighbor is 5.01 miles, so in practical applications the value of  is likely small 
compared to the price of a patient visit. Both of the upper bounds are less than —and they 
can be substantially less when  is large compared to .  
Moreover, when average patient travel distance increases through a rise in , the upper 
bounds in Eq. 2.17 and 2.18 decrease. This squeezes  and  toward zero, leading to smaller 
 
 (2.16)  
 
 (2.17)  
 
 (2.18)  
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hospital gross profit margins. Hence, both interior and exterior hospitals can face smaller profit 
margins when the average travel distance of their patients increases. Intuitively, the higher  
makes it more profitable for each interior hospital to try to capture its neighbors‘ patient volume 
(see Eq. 2.13), and as a result the exterior hospitals choose lower, more cautious prices to protect 
themselves from this threat. 
 In addition to the negative relationship between patient travel distance and hospital profit 
margins, another interesting feature of this model is that both  and  are strictly positive. By 
our initial equations for the prices, the positive  and  implies that gross profit margins in this 
system are always at least . Hence, if an insurer or government payer were to subsidize 
patient travel between any two adjacent hospitals in a cluster, the cost of medical services would 
fall by more than the amount of the subsidy. The insurer would pay at most  per patient visit, 
which would cover the expense of travelling between two adjacent hospitals. Patients would then 
view each hospital as being identical to its nearest neighbor, so the hospitals would engage in 
Bertrand price competition and price at marginal cost.
2
 The entire gross profit margins of 
 would dissipate, and the institutional payers would save more on lower medical prices 
than they spent on issuing the patient travel subsidies. 
 This model has a number of assumptions which may draw objection. In particular, we 
assume that travel costs have a very simple linear form, hospitals are placed exogenously in 
clusters, and every patient buys hospital services (i.e. the market is ‗covered‘—no patient is 
priced out). However, while we do make some strong claims for concreteness and tractability, it 
turns out that we can show that a profitable patient travel subsidy exists in the context of 
                                                             
2 Interestingly, Hotelling used travel costs to explain why Bertrand competition was not commonly observed ‗in the 
wild.‘ He called this the ‗stability of competition‘ (Hotelling 1929). By his reasoning, it makes sense that we could 
shift the outcome closer to Bertrand competition by allaying travel costs. 
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agglomeration economies and a very general class of travel cost functions. In particular, as long 
as interior hospitals have larger gross profit margins than exterior hospitals, and as long as 
patient travel costs  are monotone-increasing, concave, and such that , we can 
derive a profitable subsidy. We now briefly cover this expanded model. First, we discuss the 
implications of agglomeration economies for the cost structure of hospitals. Then, we examine 
the conditions under which a hospital will decide to reduce its price, which will inform our 
conditions on  and construction of a profitable subsidy. 
 Suppose that the production of medical services benefits from agglomeration economies, 
like the pooling of skilled labor etc. described above. Then, if interior and exterior hospitals have 
marginal costs of  and , respectively, we should have , because interior hospitals are 
situated near a greater amount of production. These cost benefits for interior hospitals must be 
sufficient to make their choice of an interior location at least as profitable as an exterior location. 
Hence, since the markets inside the clusters are smaller than those without, each interior hospital 
should have a larger gross margin on each unit of service than its exterior neighbors. In short, 
agglomeration economies imply that interior hospitals have lower marginal costs than exterior 
hospitals. Moreover, in any model of endogenous clustering, we should expect interior hospitals 
to have higher gross profit margins. Our revised, expanded model should be robust to both of 
these variations on the original model. 
Now we turn to travel costs and their implications for the construction of a profitable 
subsidy. If travel costs have a general form , then every interior hospital will produce an 
amount  where 
  (2.19)  
pg. 18 
 
 From this equality, we can observe that if an interior hospital chooses to increase its price 
by , its production quantity will change by , where 
 The profits for an interior hospital are equal to its gross margin  multiplied by 
its total patient volume .
3
 
 Likewise, the profits for an exterior hospital are the product of its patient volume 
 and its gross margin  : 
 
 By differentiating these profit functions with respect to  and , respectively, we find 
the following first order derivatives:  
and 
                                                             
3 Note that the  and  terms are doubled to reflect the symmetric markets around the interior hospital. 
 
 (2.20)  
  (2.21)  
 
 (2.22)  
 
 (2.23)  
 
 (2.24)  
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 We are interested in finding the conditions such that  and , i.e. under 
which it is profitable on the margin for each hospital to lower its price. Finding these conditions 
will allow us to construct a subsidy that encourages hospital price reductions. From the 
expression in Eq. 2.23, we have that  if and only if  
 But if , we have that , so Eq. 2.25 holds if   
Now, recall our conditions on . Namely, we have that ,  for all , 
and . In addition, we also have that , since gross margins must be non-
negative. Hence, there exists some non-negative  such that  and , 
and such that  for some . In our analysis, this value  will be the maximum 
cost of the subsidy per patient. Therefore, since , the condition in Eq. 2.26 
is satisfied if 
or, 
 
 (2.25)  
 
 (2.26)  
 
 (2.27)  
 
 (2.28)  
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By the mean value theorem, there exists some  such that  = . But 
since , we have  = .  So we can rewrite the price-reduction condition in Eq. 
2.28 as 
However, we assumed that   and . Hence, we have 
, which implies that Eq. 2.29 is satisfied if 
And by a similar argument, we can show that the price-reduction condition for exterior 
hospitals is of the form 
which if  is satisfied when  
for some . 
 To recap, when Eq. 2.30 and 2.32 are satisfied, we have  and , and each 
hospital wants to reduce its price. An important thing to notice about Eq. 2.30 and 2.32 is that 
both sides of the price-reduction inequalities are negative. When the inequalities do not hold, the 
 
 (2.29)  
 
 (2.30)  
 
 (2.31)  
 
 (2.32)  
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reason is either that  is too negative or  or is too positive. Hence, the idea of our 
subsidy is to twist the slopes of  and  in such a way as to make the inequalities 
in 2.30 and 2.32 bind. This makes  and , effectively inducing a prisoner‘s 
dilemma in the hospitals‘ price competition. Given the prices of their competitors, each interior 
and exterior hospital wants to decrease its price. But when two adjacent hospitals do reduce their 
prices, neither has really profited, yet the insurer or government payer benefits from the lower 
prices. The precise construction of the subsidy is illustrated in Figure 7 and described in detail 
below. 








In Figure 7 the hospital  is inside a cluster, while  is on the edge of a cluster. The 
original intersection of their two cost curves is labeled . To construct the subsidy, we start by 
choosing a point  to the right of , such that the vertical line segment  has length . 
We choose  to be directly below  and level with the point , i.e. such that the slope of  is 
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zero. The last significant point that we choose is , which is between  and  and placed where 
the slope . The point  must exist because  is concave, 
which makes  less negative than any tangent slope of  on the interval , and in 
particular, any   for . 
 With these key points so defined, we can proceed with the construction. Concretely, the 
subsidy is an ex-post payment that reimburses each patient for his travel expenses, altering the 
observed total cost functions. For the exterior hospital, the subsidy takes ‘s cost curve between 
the origin and  and shifts it down to the new curve . A patient between  and  pays 
no travel costs. For the interior hospital, the subsidy shifts the cost curve between  and  down 
to . We show the new, subsidized cost curves in Figure 8.  







By our construction of the key points, the subsidy costs at most  for each patient 
visit. Before any hospital has reacted to the subsidy, a patient located exactly at point  receives 
this maximum payment , and patients at other locations receive a smaller amount or no 
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subsidy at all. Moreover, as Figure 8 shows, the subsidy has the immediate effect that patients in 
the region  find that hospital  is suddenly cheaper to visit than hospital . Therefore, 
hospital  loses the middle-ground market share of . The key intuition for the subsidy is that 
 will react to this loss by attempting to take back some of the now-contested region, reducing 
its price and capturing some of ‘s market in the process. Using our price-reduction conditions 
(Eq. 2.30 and 2.32), we now argue that the subsidy will encourage a round of price reductions 
that more than makes up for its expense. 
First, note that when  is considering whether to lower its price at the new intersection 
, it observes the following: 
But recall that we chose  so that  
 Hence, combining Eq. 2.33 and 2.34,  
So the price-reduction condition in Eq. 2.30 is satisfied, implying that . Thus, the 
interior hospital wants to reduce its price.
4
 But notice that as soon as  does reduce its price, 
                                                             
4 Note that it is possible to construct a degenerate case where the right-hand derivative . However, this 
does not affect the main result. Due to the continuity of  it is possible to constrain  sufficiently so that 
, in which case the interior hospital will unambiguously decrease its price. 
  (2.33)  
 
 (2.34)  
 
 (2.35)  
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taking some market share back from , it immediately become profitable for  to reduce its 
own price. To see this, note that when  is considering a price reduction, it observes  
 and  as in Eq. 2.33. Hence, since we chose  to satisfy the expression in 2.34, we 
have the following: 
Therefore, after  lowers its price in response to the original shock of losing patient 
volume,  will reduce its own price. As each hospital lower its price, its markup becomes 
smaller, making the left hand sides of Eq. 2.26 and 2.31 less negative. This tâtonnement of price 
reductions ends when the exterior hospital  has reduced its original gross margin by at least 
half, after which the condition  in Eq. 2.27 is no longer guaranteed to bind.  Hence, the new price 
of  is no greater than . Moreover, throughout this process, every price decrease 
by  was accompanied by at least an equivalent reduction by , so the interior hospital  
must have lowered its margins even more than . Hence, both hospitals reduce their prices 
by more than , and hence more than the maximum amount  of the subsidy. The final 






 (2.36)  
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Figure 9: Final Outcome after Price Cuts  
 
 Given the construction so far, we have shown that both hospitals reduce their prices by 
more than the cost of the subsidy per hospital visit. However, to verify that the subsidy is truly 
profitable for insurers, we also need to show that it does not shift patient volume toward the 
higher-priced hospital. To see that our subsidy fits this criteria, note that when the price 
reductions finally cease, the configuration should be like that in Figure 9, where the intersection 
of cost curves is at point  on ‘s curve. The interior hospital  will reduce its price to 
this point because Eq. 2.35 is satisfied whenever the intersection of cost curves occurs on the 
segment . Due to its higher original gross profit margins, the interior hospital has enough 
pricing flexibility to lower its price to this point. Once the interior hospital has lowered its price 
until , the interior hospital will not want to reduce its price any further.
5
 Therefore, the 
distribution of patient volume between hospitals does not change from its original, pre-subsidy 
                                                             
5 The interior hospital will not reduce its price when  for two reasons: 1) the marginal cost of doing so is 
strictly negative, since the hospital gains no market share, and 2) if it did lower its price past the discontinuity, the 
intersection  would mirror the original intersection of the cost curves. We assumed that both hospitals had no 
desire to reduce their prices at the original intersection, and after the round of subsidy-induced price reductions this 
will still be true, because reducing the gross margins of a hospital increases its   at every possible intersection (see 
Eq. 2.23 and 2.24). 
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state, and we need not be concerned with shifting patients to the higher-priced hospital. The 
subsidy we have constructed is therefore profitable. 
 Thus, in the context of hospital clustering, and for a very general class of function , 
there exists a profitable patient travel subsidy. From our discussion, it may seem that hospital 
agglomeration is invoked only sparingly, and may not be important to the main result. However, 
we required the agglomeration economies to justify our claim that the interior hospitals have 
higher gross margins than their exterior neighbors. This claim ensures that the subsidy does not 
risk shifting patient volume toward a higher-priced hospital. In addition, clustering has important 
implications for the real-world application of the subsidy, because it places a cap on the gross 
margins of hospitals and reduces the cost of traveling between adjacent hospitals. This has the 
effect of reducing the cost of the subsidy, which is important because its beneficial effects would 
occur after some delay. 
 Throughout our construction of the subsidy, the concavity of  was critically 
important. The assumption that  ensures that the point  exists, and allows us to find 
an upper bound for the left-hand side of the price-reduction conditions (Eq. 2.25 and 2.31). In the 
next section, we present a short empirical argument for why the cost of travel function is concave 
in the real world.  
B.     The Marginal Costs of Patient Travel 
 During the construction of the subsidy in the preceding section, we assumed that travel 
costs were concave. With circular city-type models, however, it is often more common to use 
convex travel costs, because they make it easier to show the existence of a unique Nash-Cournot 
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equilibrium (Tirole 1988: 280).
6
 But even though convex travel costs are more common in 
spatial pricing models, they are not necessarily realistic. That travel costs are concave, like those 
in our model, is frequently assumed in research on transportation network engineering (Florian 
1986; Thomas & Griffin 1996; Yan & Luo 1999), and several economic studies have also used 
concave cost functions (Stahl 1982; Frutos, Hamoudi, & Jarque, 2001; Hamoudi & Moral 
2005).
7
 Due to the lack of consensus in the literature, in this section we provide empirical 
support that real-world travel costs take a concave form. 
First, suppose we have  patients, and each has the following marginal benefits and non-
travel costs of a hospital visit: 
and 
We wish to examine how travel distance affects the perceived cost of care. Our approach 
in this analysis is to show that concave travel costs lead to a convex plot of discharges vs. patient 
travel distance. Then we plot the data from our sample and show that it supports our claim that 
travel costs are concave.  
                                                             
6 In a 2008 paper, Agoudas and Hamoudi noted the absence of non-convex travel costs in spatial pricing theory. 
They wrote, ―Surprisingly, the literature on product differentiation has not focused on this feature, that is, the fact 
that transportation costs are concave in distance. There, it is assumed that transportation costs are convex and, as a 
result, demands for firms are connected‖ (Agoudas & Hamoudi 2008: 93). 
7 Hamoudi and Moral point out that the cost of a plane flight is generally concave with respect to distance. 
  (2.37)  
  (2.38)  
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We use the familiar notation of  for patient travel costs, where  is travel distance. 
For concreteness, we let  have a quadratic form with respect to  but we make no 
assumptions about the parameters of this function. 
If we want to adjust  to account for travel costs, we can simply add  to the 
non-travel costs. The result is the total marginal costs for patient  of visiting the hospital for a 
unit of service: 
 The aggregate marginal benefit and cost functions are now easily found by horizontally 
summing the individual functions Eq. 2.37 and 2.40 across all patients: 
 So individual patients will decide to consume patient visits until , at which 
point the total medical usage is 
  (2.39)  
  (2.40)  
 
 (2.41)  
 
 (2.42)  
 
 (2.43)  
pg. 29 
 
 Thus, the patient discharges vs. travel distance plot will be concave if  is convex 
(g>0), convex if  is concave (g<0), and linear otherwise (g=0). These relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 While we used a quadratic form to show this relationship explicitly, it holds for more 
general functions too. We can see from the expression for  that as long as  is concave, 
the plot of patient discharges vs. travel distance should be convex.  
The actual patient discharges vs. travel distance plot is illustrated in Figure 11. The plot is 
clearly convex, supporting our assumption that  is concave. In our sample the number of 
patients who traveled between ten and twenty miles is roughly 20.2% of the number who 
traveled between zero and ten. But the number who traveled between 150 and 160 miles is 
91.5% of that which traveled between 140 and 150 miles. While one could argue that the plot‘s 
shape is due to population density effects, the graph is still convex when we restrict the sample to 
patients from a small area. This supports our hypothesis that patients view travel as having 
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C.     Measuring Hospital Competition 
The degree of price competition between hospitals is important to our theoretical results 
because it affects hospital margins and, therefore, the construction and cost of patient travel 
subsidies. In both regulatory and academic contexts, the predominant measure of intra-industry 
competition is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, which is found for a given market by summing 
the squared market shares of the competing firms. Of course, the precise value of the index 
depends to a large degree on where we draw the bounds of the market—be it at the city, county, 
state, country or other level—and how we define the firms. The flavors of HHI that appear in the 
literature on hospital pricing and competition can be thought to fall into two categories: hospital-
level and owner-level. In this section we describe the two types, the common rationales for 
choosing between them, and then we present an argument for why that choice may not be so 
consequential—i.e. for why the two types of HHI may be effectively interchangeable in 
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The hospital-level approach to computing HHI is widely used in the literature (Dranove 
1993; Link 1995; Bamezai 1999; Krishnan 2001). It involves treating every hospital in the 
market as a separate firm in the calculation of market shares. The owner-level measure, on the 
other hand, treats each hospital owner as a firm. This distinction is important because hospitals 
are increasingly consolidating into health systems and private corporations, and these large 
owners tend to negotiate collectively on behalf of their hospitals, even when the hospital 
facilities and licenses remain separate (Kongstvedt, 2012: 11). One rational for using the owner-
level HHI is that it is more economically relevant—it provides a clearer picture of hospital 
pricing power because it accounts for the fact that co-owned hospitals pool their strength in 
negotiations. But as we show below, the relationship between owner- and hospital-level HHI is 
likely to be of a special linear form that makes the measures statistically similar. 
Before we directly compare owner- and hospital-level HHIs, we first describe the usual 
specification for HHI in regression equations. The most common approach is to include HHI on 
the right-hand side of the regression model with a simple linear form. The theory behind this 
form is perhaps most commonly rooted in Cournot competition, where each seller has market 
power and maximizes its profit . The first order condition of this profit 
maximization problem is as follows: 
 
 We can rearrange this to get markups—price minus marginal cost all over price—on the 
left hand side: 
  (2.44)  
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Multiplying the right hand side by  and letting  be the market share of 
hospital , we get: 
But  is just the inverse price-elasticity of demand, , so we have: 
Now multiply both sides by  and sum over all hospitals to get 
The average markup in the hospital market is, therefore, a linear function of HHI. This 
Cournot competition model is the prevailing rationale for the linear specification of HHI in 
regression equations.  
Now we consider the relationship between owner- and hospital-level HHI. First, note that 
if the hospital-level HHI is , and a merger occurs between hospitals  and , the 
new HHI should be 
 
 (2.45)  
 
 (2.46)  
 
 (2.47)  
 
 (2.48)  
  (2.49)  
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We can think of going from the hospital- to the owner-level HHI as simply recognizing 
the ‗mergers‘ of the co-owned hospitals. If we define a ownership indicator function  
then the owner-level  can be expressed as  
We let  denote the expected value of  when we don‘t know a priori if  and  are co-
owned. The value  can be thought of as the probability that any two hospitals in the sample are 
co-owned. This gives us the following: 
Using the fact that , and that the market shares are known, we can find 
or 
for some zero-mean random variable . 
 
 (2.50)  
 
 (2.51)  
 
 (2.52)  
  (2.53)  
  (2.54)  
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 When we have some dependent variable  that has a linear relationship with HHI (e.g. 
markups), and that is independent of , the estimated coefficient of  in the regression 
model should be 
 
 
 Therefore, if the market has a large diversity of owners, and the value of  is close to 
zero, the estimated coefficients on  and  will not be significantly different. In short, 
the decision to use an owner- or hospital-level HHI would not have a material effect on the 
regression results. To see whether  is close to zero in practice, we estimate the real-world 
relationship between the owner- and hospital-level variables in the next section. Our results 
support the hypothesis that the choice between the two measures has little effect on regression 
estimations.   
III.     Data & Key Variables 
 To test the theories described above, we build upon a standard empirical model relating 
hospital pricing power and concentration. We have two objectives for the model: 1) to measure 
how patient travel distance affects hospital pricing power, and 2) to determine whether the 
hospital-level and owner-level Hirschman-Herfindahl indexes are interchangeable in our 
regression estimations. To measure prices and profits we require detailed hospital financial 
 
 (2.55)  
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statements, and to estimate the effects of travel distance we need a record of patient discharges 
and origins. Our source for both the financial and patient data is California‘s Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), which collects and publishes data on revenues, 
costs and volume for California‘s more than 450 hospitals, in addition to maintaining a database 
on the state‘s more than 4 million annual patient discharges. We perform our analysis using data 
from 2008, the most recent year for which patient origin and discharge data is currently 
available. 
We discuss the theoretical form of our model and the construction of our key variables in 
the next several sub-sections. 
A. Measuring Hospital Pricing Power 
In other studies on hospital pricing, authors have used dependent variables including 
gross profit margins, markups, and of course, prices themselves (Dranove 1993: 185). For our 
regression model we use markups, which we define for a hospital i as the price that insurers pay 
for the hospital‘s services, minus the marginal costs of those services, all divided by price. The 
use of markups is appealing because it removes scalar effects on price and cost, such as changes 
in the general price level. This has the benefit of making our estimated coefficients more 
comparable with the results of studies using data from other time periods. In addition, as we 
briefly showed in the preceding section, markups have a nice theoretical relationship with the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index under Cournot competition.  
We calculate markups using the financial data from the OSHPD. For each hospital, the 
OSHPD reports revenues and units of service broken down by payer (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, 
or private insurer) and type of procedure. The revenue statements also report total capitation 
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premiums paid by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), along with total revenue deductions 
from contractual pricing discounts. While some studies have attempted to estimate prices for 
every kind of procedure (Krishnan 2001), we find this impracticable for our data because the 
OSHPD aggregates the capitation premiums and contractual deductions across procedure groups, 
and it would require ad hoc methods to redistribute them. Instead, we calculate the price for each 
hospital by taking gross revenue from MCOs, subtracting contractual deductions, adding 
capitation premiums, and dividing by total units of service. The result is effectively the average 
price paid by an MCO for a unit of medical service—either an inpatient day or outpatient visit. 
We focus on the prices that private insurers pay, rather than payers like Medicare, because the 
public-sector payers tend to pay rates that are based on a cost-estimating formula and only 
loosely related to hospital market power. 
We use this method to estimate prices for each hospital, even though every hospital in 
California is required by law to publish a ‗chargemaster,‘ or list of fees for its services. We do 
this because hospitals usually charge reduced prices to commercial insurers and government 
payers, so the chargemaster poorly reflects what most patients actually pay. An early study on 
shifts in hospital competition by Dranove (1993) confirmed that list prices are poorly related 
with hospital competition and other common explanatory variables. Our price estimations should 
better reflect what hospitals actually charge, and hence have a stronger relationship with hospital 
competition and patient travel. 
In addition to prices, we also need a measure of marginal costs in order to calculate 
markups. However, like most financial statements, the OSHPD‘s data provides total costs instead 
of marginal costs. One remedy is to divide total costs by units of service to find average costs, 
and then use these average costs as a proxy for marginal costs. However, average costs will 
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overstate marginal costs for all but the largest hospitals, since there are positive economies of 
scale in hospital operations. The markups that we calculate using average costs will therefore 
underestimate the true markups. To correct for this inaccuracy, we follow a suggestion by 
Dranove (1993) and include PPE/Sales on the right hand side of our regression model. By PPE 
we refer to the standard Plant, Property and Equipment account, net accumulated depreciation. 
After dividing PPE by sales we get a measure of average fixed costs. This new variable should 
explain the error caused by using average costs, allowing us to accurately measure the effects of 
our key variables. 
Now that we have calculated markups, we are interested in expressing them as a function 
of HHI, patient travel distance, and our other independent variables. We can think of each of our 
explanatory variables as being either hospital-level or market-level, a common expository 
approach in the literature (Dranove 1993; Krishnan 2001: 219). For example, patient travel is a 
hospital-level variable, while HHI is a market-level variable—the difference being that two 
direct competitors in the same market should have the same HHI. The markup of hospital  is 
then expressed in the following way: 
where  the markup,  is some constant,  and  are the column-vectors of market and 
hospital-level characteristics for hospital , and  and  are the row-vectors of coefficients for 
the market- and hospital-level variables respectively. 
In addition to patient travel distance, our other hospital-level variables are as follows:  
Disc  The hospital‘s total patient discharges, measured in thousands of patients. 
  (3.1)  
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Gov  Dummy variable equal to one if the hospital is owned by a city, county, or state, 
and equal to zero otherwise. 
NetNonOp The hospital‘s net non-operating revenue divided by total revenue. Non-operating 
revenue can come from the hospital‘s investment earnings, research grants, taxing authority, or 
sales of property. To find net non-operating revenue, we take non-operating revenue and subtract 
non-operating expenses, like losses on assets. After dividing by total revenue, the result, 
NetNonOp, effectively measures the hospital‘s ability to price below marginal cost—i.e., to have 
negative markups. 
NP  Dummy variable equal to one if the hospital is owned by a church or other non-
profit organization, and equal to zero otherwise. 
PPE/Sales A measure of fixed cost absorption found by dividing plant, property and 
equipment (net depreciation) by gross operating revenues. 
Spec  An index that measures hospital specialization, calculated by summing the 
squared revenue shares of the hospital‘s procedure groups. This is like a Herfindahl index for 
revenue concentration (Zwanziger et al., 1996). 
 While PPE/Sales does control for economies of scale as described above, we still include 
total patient discharges as an explanatory variable because high patient volume may benefit 
hospitals for reasons other than fixed cost absorption. The largest hospitals may have stronger 
brands, better bargaining power with suppliers, or more experienced workforces. Hence, by 
controlling for discharges we should get better estimates for the effects of competition and 
patient travel.    
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The variables Gov and NP control for hospital ownership. In general, we expect that 
government and non-profit hospitals will place a greater importance on total patients treated, 
providing educational services, and other objectives beside profit maximization. When such 
hospitals have market power, they will still probably raise their prices to some degree, because as 
Melnick et al. point out, non-profits have an incentive to seek resources to spend on their 
charitable goals (Melnick et al., 1999).  Nonetheless, non-profit and government hospitals will 
likely have smaller markups than their for-profit counterparts due to their desire to keep medical 
prices affordable. Hence, we expect Gov and NP to have negative effects on markups. In addition 
to their charitable goals, the non-profit hospitals may also benefit from subsidies, favorable tax 
treatment, and affiliation with wealthy parent organizations. Rather than leave such effects to the 
dummy variables, we control for them more directly by including net non-operating income 
(NetNonOp) on the right-hand side of our model. Like Gov and NP, the NetNonOp variable 
should have a negative effect on markups, because it effectively measures the hospital‘s ability 
to price below marginal cost. 
Our last hospital-level variable is Spec. In our sample, the hospitals with the greatest 
average patient travel distance also tend to be highly specialized—most commonly in the fields 
of pediatric care, psychiatric treatment or substance abuse rehabilitation. The correlation between 
our specialization index Spec and patient travel variables is . Moreover, specialized 
hospitals tend to command premium prices because they are relatively scarce and the services 
they provide often have small elasticities of demand. Hence, it is essential to control for 
specialization in order to accurately measure the effect of patient travel on hospital markups. Our 
construction of the specialization index is similar to the ―Service Mix HHI‖ defined by 
Zwanziger et al. (1996). For each hospital, we divide the revenue from each procedure (e.g. 
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echocardiology, pediatric intensive care) by the hospital‘s total revenue, and then we sum the 
squares of these proportions across all procedure groups. As noted by Zwanziger et al., the 
properties of this measure are very similar to those of a Herfindahl index. 
For our market-level variables, on the other hand, we include HHI, private insurance 
penetration, and the average age and income for the area of the hospital‘s patients: 
HHI  A measure of market concentration equal to the sum of squared market shares of 
hospitals (or hospital owners) in the market. One of our empirical goals is to demonstrate that the 
owner- and hospital-level HHIs are interchangeable in regression models. To this end, we run 
our model using both the owner- and hospital-level measures and report the estimated 
coefficients in the results section. 
Age  The average age of patients visiting the hospital. 
Income The average annual salary in thousands of dollars in the hospital‘s market. 
InsurePen The insurance penetration of the hospital‘s market, i.e. the proportion of patients 
covered by private insurance in the hospital‘s market. 
 The computation of these market-level variables depends to a large degree on how we 
define our hospital markets. There is no standard way to construct markets in the existing 
literature, so we discuss the alternatives and describe our method below.  Then we detail the 
calculation of the market level variables. 
B.     Defining Hospital Markets 
 In industrial economics, there is no gold standard for how to define a market, and this is 
particularly evident in hospital research. To construct hospital markets, some authors use 
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geopolitical units like cities, counties, and ZIP codes (Dranove 1993; Dranove 2002; Lynk 
1995), while others use distance-based measures (Patel 1994). However, both the geopolitical 
and distance-based markets are less than ideal, because they rely on abstract regions that have 
little bearing on actual patient choices. For our research, we instead use a ‗patient-flow‘ 
approach, which defines markets based on actual patient locations and discharges (Bamezai et al. 
1999; Krishnan 2001). By looking at patient origins, we can see the regions from which each 
hospital draws its patients, and observe whether any two hospitals are truly competitors. This 
method should make our variables like HHI more economically relevant. We now describe in 
detail the construction of our hospital markets and associated variables. 
To construct our markets with the patient-flow approach, we use an OSHPD database on 
patient discharges in California in 2008. For more than four million discharges, the OSHPD 
reports the patient‘s home ZIP code, method of payment, and the hospital at which the patient 
received service (OSHPD 2008). While our data comes from a different source, the basic 
procedure of our construction is very similar to that of Bamezai et al. (1999). We define a 
hospital‘s market to be the collection of ZIP codes from which the hospital draws patients. Of 
course, not every ZIP code contributes equally to the hospital‘s total volume. Therefore, when 
we construct hospital-level variables, we give greater weight to the ZIP codes that are 
responsible for a larger proportion of the patients. For example, to find the HHI for a given 
hospital, we calculate a separate HHI for each ZIP code in the hospital‘s market, and then 
perform a weighted average on these HHIs, with the weights given by the proportion of patients 
that come from each respective code. 
To calculate HHI for each ZIP code, we sum the squared market shares of hospitals in the 
code. With this approach, one technical consideration is that we might count two hospitals as 
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competitors even if they are specialized in wildly different fields. For example, if a psychiatric 
hospital and a cardiac hospital serve a given  ZIP code, where each accounts for half the patient 
discharges, we might assign the ZIP code an HHI of one half. However, this would not be an 
accurate picture of the hospital market in the area, because the two hospitals draw from different 
pools of patients and are not direct competitors. Therefore, to control for such specialization, we 
compute procedure-specific HHIs for each of eleven diagnoses groups: infections, neoplasms, 
endocrine system, psychoses & neuroses, circulatory, respiratory, digestive, genitourinary, 
pregnancies & neonatal care, musculoskeletal disorders, and injuries and complications. We 
calculate eleven diagnosis-specific HHIs for each hospital, and then we average them together, 
using as weights the proportion of the hospital‘s patients with the respective diagnosis. With this 
construction, a specialized hospital will have an HHI that reflects the true competitive 
environment for its particular services.  
The diagnoses-specific method is used to construct both owner- and hospital-level HHIs. 
For the owner-level version, the only change is that we combine the market shares of co-owned 
hospitals when calculating the HHI for each ZIP code. To test our theory that owner and 
hospital-level HHI are practically interchangeable, we report our regression results using both 
owner- and hospital-level HHI in section IV.    
Two other market level variables, AGE and InsurePen, are calculated with the same data 
and general method. The OSHPD discharge data reports age ranges, which we use to calculate 
the average age of each hospital‘s patients. To find insurance penetration, we simply take the 
proportion of patients who paid with private insurance in each ZIP code, and average this across 
the ZIP codes in the market of each hospital. 
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We also control for the average income in each hospital‘s market. The income data 
comes from the 2008 County Business Patterns: ZIP Code Business Statistics Survey of the U.S. 
Census Bureau. The survey reports the total number of paid employees for every ZIP code, along 
with the total paid wages in thousands of dollars. To find the average income for each ZIP code, 
we simply divide the total wages by the number of employees. While this measure only includes 
cash compensation and omits employee benefits, it should give us a good picture of patient 
buying power. We expect that hospitals whose patients have higher average incomes will 
command larger price premiums, due to a greater demand for higher margin, specialized 
services.  
C.     Patient Travel 
 To test if patient travel distance has a negative effect on hospital pricing power, we use 
two variables: average patient travel distance ( ), and distance from the hospital to its nearest 
neighbor ( ). We use these two variables to form an estimate of , as in section II.A, which 
we include as a variable in our regression model. This approach avoids the technical difficulties 
of assigning hospitals to clusters and calculating  directly. 
The OSHPD database reports the physical address of each hospital and the home ZIP 
code of each patient. We use the addresses and ZIP codes to estimate the latitude and longitude 
of each hospital and patient origin, and we compute travel distance with a great circle distance 
formula. By averaging across all discharges, we find the average patient travel distance  for 
each hospital. We use the same approach to calculate the distance between each pair of hospitals, 
and we denote the distance from each hospital  to its closest neighbor by .   
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In our model in II.A, the average patient travel distance for each hospital is a linear 
combination of the variables  and : 
Hence, if we divide  by  for each hospital, the result is a linear function of 
with positive parameters  and . We use  to denote the result: 
By including  in our regression model, we can test the hypothesis that  has a negative 
effect on hospital prices when it is large compared to . Between hospitals, the parameters   
and  can vary, but this approach amounts to using a proxy for  if we assume that the 
unobserved  is independent of  and the explanatory variables. More intuitively, this new 
variable simply measures the tendency of each hospital to draw patients from beyond the 
distance to its closest neighbor. This should allow us to test the theory that hospitals have less 
pricing power when they are close together and draw patients from a wide area. We report the 
estimated coefficients of our model in the next section. 
IV.     Results 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our regression variables. The dependent variable, 
hospital markup, is slightly negative on average, but this is explained by net non-operating 
revenue and PPE/sales as discussed in section III.A. 
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Net Non-Operating Revenue 0.54 
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Insurance Penetration  0.31   0.17 
     Source: Author's computation from 2008 OSHPD and 
U.S. Census. 
  
 The owner-level Herfindahl index is always larger than the hospital-level HHI, and its 
mean is therefore greater. Furthermore, when we regress the owner-level on the hospital-level 
HHI, we get a strong linear relationship as shown in Figure 12. The estimated slope of this line is 
close to one, supporting our theory in section II.C that the HHI variables should give similar 




































The estimates for our main model appear in Table 2. The original specification uses 
owner-level HHI and the full set of control variables, and its coefficients appear in the first 
column. We report variations on this specification in columns (2), (3), and (4). In column (2), we 
use a hospital-level HHI, and in (3) and (4) we omit the HHI variable altogether, and (3) includes 
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Adjusted   .355   .349   .338   .329 
         Note: The t-statistics appear in parentheses. Data from 2008 OSHPD and U.S. Census. N = 310. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
        ** Significant at 5% level. 
        * Significant at 10% level. 
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 The variables HHI and  both represent concentration, so it is little surprise that the 
coefficient of  is small when we include HHI in (1) and (2). However, after removing HHI in 
(3) and (4), we see that  has a positive effect on hospital pricing power, as predicted in II.A. 
The estimated coefficient for  is significant at the 5% level in Eq. (4). Intuitively, when the 
distance from a hospital to its nearest neighbor is large, that hospital has a greater buffer for its 
profit margin, and hence higher markups. The estimated coefficient in (4) suggests that 
increasing this distance by one mile leads to a .2% increase in markups. 
 In every specification, the coefficient on the distance ratio is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. This ratio is a proxy for , so the negative coefficient supports our theory in 
section II.A that  reduces pricing power when it is large compared to . When  is large for 
a given hospital, its neighbors will be more aggressive in their price competition, as explained in 
II.A. Thus, to protect its market share, the hospital needs to be more cautious in its pricing, 
leading to lower markups. The negative coefficient on  also supports our assumption of 
non-convex patient travel costs. When travel costs are non-convex, each hospital has more to 
gain by dropping its ‗total cost‘ curve, a fact we that used to derive the negative relationship 
between  and hospital prices.   
 The estimated distance coefficients are not significant at, say, 1%, but this imprecision 
has several explanations. First, the variable  is essentially a one-dimensional measure. It tells 
us the distance to the nearest hospital, but a more relevant variable might instead consider the 
several closest surrounding hospitals. Second, the negative relationship between  and  only 
occurs when the hospitals are sufficiently clustered (see Eq. 2.14). If a large number of hospitals 
in our sample are not clustered, the negative relationship between  and hospital pricing 
power is weakened. When we restrict our sample to the hospitals which have a neighbor within 
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five miles, the  coefficient is more negative and becomes significant in model (4) at the 5% 
level. Finally, the OSHPD provides only ZIP codes rather than full patient addresses, so when we 
calculate travel distance we must estimate the true patient origins. While this measurement error 
should be uncorrelated with our control variables and should not lead to biased coefficients, it 
does add imprecision to our estimates. 
 We also note that the coefficients for the HHI variables agree with our discussion in 
section II.C. The owner-level HHI has a slightly greater effect than the hospital-level HHI. This 
is consistent with the predicted relationship in Eq. 2.55, and suggests that the parameter  is 
close to zero. Hence, while the owner-level HHI may be more economically relevant, our result 
suggests that the hospital-level HHI still captures much of the useful information. Further 
consolidation in the hospital industry could change this picture by increasing , but for now, at 
least, it appears that estimations with hospital- and owner-level HHIs are similar in magnitude 
and roughly comparable. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that controlling for specialization is crucial to our 
empirical results. As shown in Table 2, the effect of specialization on hospital pricing power is 
positive and highly significant. Moreover, specialized hospitals tend to draw patients from 
farther afield, while often being clustered in cities or around universities. Hence, if we remove 
specialization from our model, the coefficients on the distance ratio are biased upward and 
become insignificant. By including specialization we control for this effect and get a more 
accurate test of our theory. The results confirm that when a hospital draws patients from beyond 




V.     Discussion 
In standard I/O theory, travel distance acts as a shield for profits, because customers are 
willing to pay higher prices to firms that are nearby. Both theoretically and empirically, we have 
argued that the interior distance of a cluster does indeed offer such protection—i.e., it is better 
for a hospital when its closest neighbors are far away. However, our regression model suggests 
that the exterior distance of a cluster has the opposite effect. When a hospital draws patients from 
beyond the distance to its nearest neighbor, our model shows that its markups are smaller. Thus, 
the relationship between average patient travel distance and hospital prices can actually be 
negative. 
This empirical result has two implications. First, in the context of our theory, a negative 
distance-price relationship only occurs when travel costs are non-convex and hospitals are 
sufficiently clustered. When we constructed the subsidy, we used non-convex travel costs, so our 
finding of the negative relationship offers additional support for that assumption. The presence of 
hospital clustering also made the subsidy less expensive, since the maximum subsidy was strictly 
less than the cost of traveling between the hospital and its nearest neighbor. Hence, our data 
supports the theoretical conditions for the subsidy and suggests that its real world cost may not 
be too onerous. 
Second, the negative relationship between travel distance and prices means that the usual 
I/O narrative requires a caveat. Instead of referring to ‗customer travel distance‘ generally, it may 
be more informative to consider travel distance in two parts: interior, like the  in our theory, 
and exterior, like the . When travel costs are non-convex and firms have agglomeration 
economies, the  part of customer travel can actually have a negative effect on firm pricing 
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power. An interesting subject of future research would be to take this relationship into account in 
a more complete model of endogenous firm location.  
For our theory of the subsidy, we used a highly stylized setting and various assumptions 
which may seem unrealistic. However, the intuition of the subsidy has practical appeal. In short, 
by influencing travel costs, the insurer makes it easier for hospitals to gain patients through price 
reductions. When each hospital wants to reduce its price, given the prices of its competitors, the 
result is a prisoner‘s dilemma in which every hospital lowers its price and becomes less 
profitable in the end. Moreover, many of the assumptions of the subsidy are easy to check on a 
hospital-by-hospital basis, particularly with the information available to insurers. For example, 
an insurer can estimate hospital gross margins by using billing records to find prices and 
financial statements to estimate costs. The subsidy is then designed so that its immediate impact 
is to reduce the market share of the hospital with the higher gross margin, as explained in section 
II.A.  In short, despite our simplified model, the intuition of the subsidy is quite simple: insurers 
can make markets more competitive by making patients more mobile. As a substantial part of 
hospital price premiums is due to the local competitive environment, travel subsidies have great 
potential for promoting lower medical prices. 
The relationship between the two HHI variables, derived in Eq. 2.55 and confirmed by 
our regression model, suggests that the owner-level HHI does have a stronger effect on pricing 
power, but only by a small amount. If a researcher has data on hospital ownership, it is better to 
use the owner-level HHI. But if such data is not available, the hospital-level HHI can still capture 
much of the useful information and yield estimates that are roughly comparable with those from 
the owner-level approach. As further consolidation takes place, however, it will become more 
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important to use the owner-level variable. The effects of consolidation are captured by the 
parameter   in our theoretical model. 
Finally, we note that the travel subsidies may allow MCOs to obtain price reductions in 
markets where traditional methods have failed. A travel subsidy does not entirely rely on the 
existing level of competition, but rather encourages new competition by creating contested 
regions. When a hospital is unswayed by network contracting, it may still respond to a loss of 
patient volume by cutting its price, initiating the round of reductions described in our theory. 
Moreover, since insurers have good information on hospital prices, the subsidy could be further 
refined to direct patients to the lower-priced hospital. The subsequent savings would defray part 
of the initial cost, and give the subsidy an immediate positive impact. When patients have poor 
information, the subsidy has even greater potential to be profitable, because it allows insurers to 




Arguedas, C., Hamoudi, H. (2008). A Note on Product Differentiation under Concave 
Transportation Costs. Cuadernos de Economía., 31, 91-106. 
Bamezai, A., Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G., & Mann, J. (1999). Price Competition and Hospital 
Cost Growth in the United States (1989-1994). Health Economics, 8, 233-243. 
Bates, L.,  Santerre, R. (2005). Do Agglomeration Economies Exist in the Hospital Services 
Industry?. Eastern Economic Journal, 31(4), 617-628. 
pg. 53 
 
Cohen, J., Paul, C. (2008). Agglomeration and Cost Economies for Washington State Hospital 
Services. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 38, 553-564. 
d‘Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). On Hotelling‘s Stability in 
Competition. Econometrica, 17, 1145-1151. 
Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & White, W. D. (1993). Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets: 
The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competition. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(1), 179-204. 
Dranove, D., Simon, C. J., & White, W. D. (2002). Is Managed Care Leading to Consolidation in 
Health-care Markets? Health Services Research, 37(3), 573-594. 
Economides, N. (1984). Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated 
Product Markets. Mimeo, Colombia University 
Florian, M. (1986). Nonlinear Cost Network Models in Transportation Analysis. Mathematical 
Programming Study, 26, 167-196 
Frutos, M., Hamoudi, H., & Jarque, X. (2001). Spatial competition with concave transport costs.     
Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid . 
Hamoudi, H., Moral, M. (2005). Equilibrium Existence in the Linear Model: Concave versus 
Convex Transportation Costs. Papers in Regional Science, 84(2), 201-219. 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41 – 57. 
Krishnan, R. (2001, March). Market Restructuring and Pricing in the Hospital Industry. Journal 
of Health Economics, 20(2), 213-237. 
Kongstvedt, P. R. (2012). Essentials of Managed Health Care. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett 
Learning. 
Lynk, W. J. (1995, October). Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 38(2), 437-461. 
Melnick, G., Keeler, E., & Zwanziger, J. (1999). Market Power and Hospital Pricing: Are 
Nonprofits Different? Health Affairs , 18 (3), 167-173. 
pg. 54 
 
Mirchandani, P., & Odoni, A. (1979). Locating new passenger facilities on a transportation 
network. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological , 13 (2), 113 -122. 
Patel, J. S., Needleman, J., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1994, April). Changing Fortunes, Hospital 
Behaviors, and Ownership Forms. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. 
Salop, S. (1979). Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. Bell Journal of Economics. 10: 
141-156. 
Stahl, K. (1982). Location and Spatial Pricing Theory with Nonconvex Transportation Cost 
Schedules. Bell Journal of Economics. 13: 575-582. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Thomas, D., Griffen P. (1996). Coordinated Supply Chain Management. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 94 (1), 1-15. 
Yan, S., Luo, S. (1999). Probabilistic Local Search Algorithms for Concave Cost Transportation 
Network Problems. European Journal of Operational Research, 117 (3), 511-521. 
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G., & Bamezai, A. (1994). Costs and and Price Competition in 
California Hospitals, 1980 - 1990. Health Affairs, 13 (4), 118-126. 
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G., & Simonson, L. (1996). Differentiation and Specialization in the   
California Hospital Industry 1983 to 1988. Medical Care , 34 (4), 361-372. 
Zwanziger, J., & Melnick, G. A. (1996). Can Managed Care Plans Control Health Care Costs? 
Health Affairs, 15(2), 185-199. 
 
 
 
